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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
On appeal, Mr. Moore asserted that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his request to have the district court remove his 2003 Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinafter,

PSI) and attached Psychosexual Evaluation

(hereinafter, PSE) from the possession of the Idaho Department of Corrections
(hereinafter, IDOC) to prevent its further use by the parole board in determining whether
Mr. Moore will be paroled at the conclusion of the fixed portion of his sentence and his
programming requirements while incarcerated. The instant Reply Brief is necessary to
respond to the State's assertions that Mr. Moore did not challenge all of the grounds for
the district court's ruling and that Mr. Moore somehow waived his ability to challenge the
use of the PSE by the IDOC.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Moore's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Moore's motion to remove the 2003 PSI from
the possession of the IDOC?'

On appeal, Mr. Moore also challenged the excessiveness of his sentence as imposed
by the district court. Although that issue is not addressed herein, Mr. Moore continues
to assert that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence
upon him.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denvinq Mr. Moore's Motion To Remove His
2003 PSI From The IDOC Because The District Court Failed To Recoqnize It Had
Discretion To Require The IDOC To Relinquish Possession Of The PSI

A.

Introduction
The district court erred by denying Mr. Moore's motion to remove his 2003 PSI

and the attached psychosexual evaluation from the IDOC. The district court abused its
discretion because it failed to recognize that it had any discretion to remove the report
from the IDOC. Mr. Moore requests that this matter be remanded to the district court
with instructions that the IDOC return Mr. Moore's 2003 PSI to the district court.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denyinq Mr. Moore's Motion To
Remove His 2003 PSI From The IDOC Because The District Court Failed To
Recognize It Had Discretion To Require The IDOC To Relinquish Possession Of
The PSI
1.

Mr. Moore Properlv Challenged The District Court's Basis For Its Decision
To Deny Mr. Moore's Request To Remove His 2003 PSI From The IDOC

In its briefing, the State has argued that "the record shows that Moore has not
challenged the district court's alternative basis for its ruling.

.

. ." (Respondent's Brief,

p.5.) The State then cited to only a portion of the district court's "alternative basis" for its
decision and represented that the district court found that there "is no underlying Fifth
Amendment violation that would merit denying the Department of Correction access to
information in the 2003 PSI or 2003 PSE already in the Department's possession."
(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.)

However, a review of the district court's oral

pronouncement, in its entirety, shows the State's argument to be meritless and a
misrepresentation of the proceedings in the lower court.
In denying Mr. Moore's motion to remove the 2003 PSI report from the IDOC, the
district court stated:

I don't know that the Court is really inclined to remove these reports
from the file. First of all, I think the file is the file, and it needs to maintain
integrity. If there is a subsequent appeal of the decision this Court makes,
that file needs to remain intact. Now, I don't have a problem ordering the
presentence report in this case. The old one is, in fact, sealed. As I've
indicated, it's remained sealed and I didn't unseal it for purposes of
consideration of sentencing today.
The December 8threport of 2008, which is prepared, I can certainly
direct that that also be sealed and not forwarded down to the Department
of Corrections because that's not going to be part of the report that was
considered for purposes of this disposition. So the Court can certainly
direct the clerk to do that.
Furthermore, I don't think I can order the Department of Corrections
to do anything with the information that they already have. I'm not even
sure I have the jurisdiction at this point in time to interfere with that.
Perhaps some collateral action that Mr. Moore may want to bring so the
Department of Corrections may not use that information inappropriately,
but I don't think I can reach out and grab that information that was already
distributed some five years or so ago to the Department of Corrections.
Furthermore, the whole issue here in front of the Court, I believe,
involves Mr. Moore's Fifth Amendment rights, and the presentence
investigation contains a lot of information, some of which is totally and
completely unrelated to the cr~ticalissue that ultimately has resulted in this
resentencing. So I don't feel that I'm inclined to do anything other than to
make sure that we seal the presentence report, the first one that was done
on the resentencing and that was the December 8threport, and we'll make
sure that's sealed and is not forwarded to the Department of Corrections. .
(3123109 Tr., p.12, L.2 - p.13, ~ . 1 9 . ) *

*

The italicized portion was the only part of the district court's oral pronouncement
quoted by the State. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.)

Viewed in its entirety the district court's sole basis for its decision to deny
Mr. Moore's motion was that it did not believe it had the authority to grant the motion
and "felt" as though it could only order the newest PSI to be sealed. The district court,
however, did not find "that there is no underlying Fifth Amendment violation that would
merit denying the Department of Correction access'' to the 2003 PSI or 2003 PSE. (See
Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) Rather, the Court found just the opposite, first identifying
that the central issue was a violation of Mr. Moore's Fifth Amendment rights; then
observing that the 2003 PSI "contains a lot of information" unrelated the critical issues,
the Fifth Amendment violation, the resulted in resentencing. (3123109 Tr., p.12, L.2 p. 13, L. 19.) Accordingly, the State's position is without merit.
2.

Mr. Moore Did Not Waive The Fifth Amendment Protections

The United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the ldaho Supreme
Court have all held that the Fifth Amendment protections apply to evaluations that
potentially compel self-incriminatory information. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454,
460 (1981) (holding that a criminal defendant who neither initiates a psychiatric exam,
nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to
a psychiatrist if statements he makes can be used against him during a capital
sentencing proceeding); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999) (extending
Estelle to non-capital cases.); United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128 (gthCir. 2005)

(holding that the revocation of probation and supervised release violated Antelope's
Fifth Amendment protections when, as a condition of probation, probationer was
required to submit to a psychosexual evaluation that required a full disclosure verified
by polygraph examinations.); and State v. Wood, 132 ldaho 88, 967 P.2d 702 (1998)

(holding that defense attorney's failure to object to the inclusion of a psychological
evaluation in a presentence investigation report constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel).
While the Fifth Amendment protections apply to psychosexual evaluations, to
invoke the protections of the Fifth Amendment such that coerced statements must be
suppressed, the defendant must either invoke the right and actually remain silent, or
show that his failure to remain silent falls within one of the recognized exceptions for
failing to remain silent. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984.) The first
exception applies to witnesses who are interrogated while being held in police custody.

Id. at 430. The second exception requires establishing: "1) that the testimony desired
by the government carried the risk of incrimination . . . and 2) that the penalty he
suffered amounted to compulsion."

Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1134.

The risk of

incrimination must be "real and appreciable," but does not require that "the prosecutorial
sword must actually strike or be poised to strike." Id. The compulsion prong inquiries
"whether the government has sought to 'impose substantial penalties because a witness
elects to exercise his fifth amendment right not to give incriminating testimony against
himself."' Id. at 1135
The Ninth Circuit analyzed this issue in Antelope.
was charged with a federal child pornography offense.

In Antelope, the defendant
Id. at 1131. Following his

conviction, the court sentenced him to probation. Id. As a condition of probation,
Mr. Antelope had to provide a full-disclosure sexual history. Id. Mr. Antelope raised a
Fifth Amendment claim to undergoing a full sexual history disclosure as a condition of
probation. Id. His claim was denied and while the appeal was pending, his probation

was revoked for failing to comply with the sex offender treatment program component
requiring the full disclosure. Id. Eventually, Mr. Antelope's probation was revoked and
he was ordered to spend time in prison.

Id. at 1132. After being released from

incarceration, as a condition of release, Mr. Antelope was again ordered to participate in
treatment, a component of which required a full disclosure of his sexual history. Id.
Mr. Antelope requested treatment and a willingness to participate in treatment, but
refused to participate in the polygraph or the sexual history disclosure. Id. His release
was revoked and he was again incarcerated.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit discussed the two prong test articulated above and
held that Mr. Antelope's risk of incrimination was "real and appreciable" because his
ongoing steadfastness to refuse to comply created a likely inference that his disclosure
would reveal other sexual offenses. Id. at 1135. This inference comported with the
opinion of Mr. Antelope's counselor, who believed Mr. Antelope had committed other
offenses. Id. Finally, the court noted that under state law, Mr. Antelope's counselor
was required to report any disclosed sexual offenses, he had reported other client's
offenses in the past, and those reports had led to other convictions. Id. The court
succinctly summarized:
Setting the privilege aside, Antelope would have to reveal past sex crimes
to the SABER counselor; the counselor would likely report the incidents to
the authorities, who could then use Antelope's admissions to prosecute
and convict him of the additional crimes. Viewed in this light, very little
stands between Antelope's participation in SABER and future prosecution.

Id.
In determining that Mr. Antelope was compelled to provide this incriminating
testimony, the Ninth Circuit looked to United States Supreme Court analysis in a string

of cases, and relied primarily on McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in a 4-1-4 decision). Justice O'Connor's concurrence was the opinion relied
upon by the Ninth Circuit because, when "no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds." Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1133 citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In McKune, supra, although the plurality found no compulsion, Justice O'Connor
made clear that although:
Lile's reduction in incentive level, and ... corresponding transfer from a
medium-security to a maximum-security part of the prison' were not
penalties 'sufficiently serious to compel his testimony, ... "she d[id] not
agree with the suggestion in the plurality opinion that these penalties could
permissibly rise to the level of . . . penalties [like] longer incarceration and
execution [which] are far greater than those we have already held to
constitute unconstitutional compulsion.
Id. at 1137 (citing McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 50-52). And, when looking at the cases
in which the United States Supreme Court has found compulsion, it appears that the
Court would find that a longer period of incarceration would amount to compulsion. Id.
The Court then held that the State could not "sanction Antelope for his selfprotective silence about conduct that might constitute other crimes." Id. The Court
noted that, "Even though the disclosures sought here may serve a valid rehabilitative
purpose, they also may be starkly incriminating, and there is no disputing that the
government may seek to use such disclosures for prosecutorial purposes." Id.
After finding compulsion, the Court also found that the risk of incrimination for
Mr. Antelope was "real and appreciable" because:

Antelope has already suffered repeated revocation of his conditional
liberty as a result of invoking his Fifth Amendment right. And, we have no
doubt that Antelope's loss of liberty was as "substantial" a penalty as, if
not more serious than, the ones imposed upon the litigants in the line of
cases from Spevack to Cunningham - and totally unlike the mere transfer
from one part of the prison to another, as in McKune.
Id. at 1139.
In the case at bar, Mr. Moore did not assert his Fifth Amendment privilege
against participating in the psychosexual evaluation, until he filed his petition seeking
post conviction relief. However, he can establish that the testimony desired by the
government carried the risk of incrimination . . . and that the penalty he suffered
amounted to compulsion." Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1134. The compulsion prong inquiries
"whether the government has sought to 'impose substantial penalties because a witness
elects to exercise his fifth amendment right not to give incriminating testimony against
himself."' Id. at 1135
On June 11, 2003, the court ordered that Mr. Moore complete a psychosexual
evaluation to be conducted by Drs. Hearn and Timlin. (R.30096, pp.37-38.)3 Moreover,
if ordered by the district court, I.C. § 18-8316 makes a psychosexual evaluation
mandatory on the part of Mr. Moore.

See §18-8316 ("If ordered by the court, an

offender convicted of any offense listed in section 18-8304, ldaho Code, shall submit to
an evaluation . . . for the court's consideration prior to sentencing and incarceration or
release on probation.") Like in Antelope, had Mr. Moore revealed any other offenses,
the psychosexual evaluator would have been required to disclose that to the police.
See ldaho Code § 16-1619, requiring "[alny physician, resident on a hospital staff,

intern, nurse, coroner, school teacher, day care personnel, social worker, or other
person having reason to believe that a child under the age of eighteen (18) years has
been abused," must report that abuse or face misdemeanor charges).

Thus, any

disclosures made by Mr. Moore would have been forwarded to the prosecutor,
subjecting Mr. Moore to additional criminal charges. Thus, regardless of whether any
charges were actually filed, as in Antelope, it is the risk of charges that satisfy the
compulsion element.
Additionally, the risk of incrimination was "real and appreciable" because his
sentencing was already set for a certain date. Thus, because Mr. Moore established
both the compulsion and actual incrimination he faced, he is entitled to invoke the
protections of the Fifth Amendment, and be able to suppress the psychosexual
evaluation in this case. Accordingly, Mr. Moore has sufficiently invoked the protections
of the Fifth Amendment, such that this Court should conclude that the protections of the
Fifth Amendment apply to psychosexual evaluations.
Moreover, as is set forth in more detail in Mr. Moore's Appellant's Brief, a finding
that Mr. Moore has waived his Fifth Amendment protections in the instant case
seemingly makes the protections and decision in both Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558,
149 P.3d 833 (2007) and State v. Rodriguez, 132 ldaho 261, 971 P.2d 327 (1998)
illusory such that a party obtaining relief under Estrada would continued to be punished
by the parole board failing to release him on parole for his counsel's failure to advise
him of his protection against self incrimination. As such, Mr. Moore is given a right (the

Mr. Moore has filed a Motion Requesting that this Court take judicial notice of its
records in his two previous appeals leading to the instant case, S.C. Docket No. 30096
and S.C. Docket No.32756.

ability to file a post conviction action alleging ineffective assistance of counsel), without
a complete remedy. See Coleman v. State, 114 Idaho 901, 902; 762 P.2d 814, 815
(1988) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 97 S. Ct. 1491 (1977), "Perhaps the constitutional
right most critical to prisoners is that of access to courts. Without access it is impossible
for them to use the judicial system to vindicate other rights. Rights without remedies are
often meaningless, and remedies without access to courts for their enforcement can be
illusory.")
Accordingly, Mr. Moore respectfully requests that this case be remanded to the
district court with instructions that his 2003 PSI, and all of its contents (including the
psychosexual evaluation), be removed from the possession of the IDOC.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Moore respectfully requests that this case be remanded to the district court
with instructions that his 2003 PSI be removed from the possession of the IDOC.
Additionally, Mr. Moore requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 28thday of June, 2010.

I

/

ERICWFREDERICKSEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2gth day of June, 2010, 1 served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:

WALTER E MOORE
INMATE # 71366
ICC
PO BOX 70010
BOISE ID 83707
JOHN P LUSTER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
PO BOX 9000
COEUR D ALENE ID 83816 9000
ISABELLA ROBERTSON
BONNER COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
406 SOUTH ELLA STREET
SANDPOINT ID 83864
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720 0010
Hand deliver to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court

/

HEATHER R. LEWIS
Administrative Assistant

